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?2. Conditional assertion. Affirmation or assertion is a human act, hence a concept of pragmatics. It is my belief, however, that although the fullest articulation of the Quine-Rhinelander idea of conditional assertion doubtless requires a pragmatic theory involving not only affirmation but also commitment, acknowledgement of error, and the like, we can nevertheless use the suggestion as a guide to an understanding which stops at the semantic level. I shall therefore take as my aim the provision of an interesting and revealing formal semantics for a language involving forms of speech which can be used to make conditional assertions.
In moving from the pragmatic to the semantic level, I shall have to depragmatize the key notion of assertion itself, proposing an only semantic, and for this reason truncated, version of the concept. I wish therefore to speak of sentences asserting instead of people asserting. But what is it that sentences are to be taken as asserting? For the moment I shall leave that question unanswered, so that at this point the proposal has as its total force the selection of a semantic primitive having the linguistic form, "what A asserts," where A is a sentence. In addition I shall need the semantic concepts of truth and falsity as carried by the forms, "A is true" and "A is false," for these concepts are used in Quine's account of the Rhinelander conditional: whether or not the conditional asserts anything depends on whether or not its antecedent is true or false. A fourth concept is also required, one matching the part of the description which says that when the antecedent is false, "our conditional affirmation is as if it had never been made." In these circumstances we do not want the function, "what A asserts," defined at all for the conditional, for if the conditional asserted something according to semantics, we could not on the pragmatic level treat its utterance as if it had never happened. The fourth concept is therefore introduced to tell us when a sentence asserts something; when, that is, the locution "what A asserts" is defined for it, and when instead it does not assert anything, so that "what A asserts" is undefined. I shall carry this fourth concept in the artificial locution, "A is assertive." To say that a sentence, A, is assertive is to say that A asserts something, and to say that A is nonassertive is to say that A asserts nothing. (It is not to say that A is "meaningless" in any sensible sense; to say so would be a bad joke, for certainly it continues to have determinate semantic relations, etc.) , One more detail: I shall use the notation (A/B) for that conditional assertion which is the assertion of B on the condition A. This first try would need repair were we to allow a conditional assertion to occur within the scope of another, but although having a look at that situation seems to me an essential part of the larger enterprise, for immediate purposes I keep things simple by disallowing such nesting. But even so, (1) will not do for a language containing, as ours will, sentence variables. As we have known since Tarski, semantic truth for such a language is relative to an interpretation, so that I should not say boldly, as in (1), that A is true, but more modestly that A is true on a certain interpretation. Instead of interpretations, however, I shall follow the current fashion by speaking of possible worlds, saying that sentence A is true in possible world w. Similarly we shall want "A is false in w," "A is assertive in w," and-somewhat surprisingly, but for good and sufficient reason arising out of a consideration of connectives other than conditional assertion-"what A asserts in w."
We are therefore led to a version of the semantics of (A/B), obtained from (1) merely by adding the relativizing phrase "in w" at every possible place. But before displaying it, I make two purely technical maneuvers. First I introduce some hen scratches which, aside from their slight convenience, serve to emphasize the fundamental notions of the semantic apparatus. Let A be a sentence and let w be a possible world. Note that for atomic A, neither Aw, nor whether A is assertivew, depends on w, so that atomic sentences are categorical in the sense that they are always assertive and always assert the same thing. Semantics for the quantifiers are here based on a "substitution interpretation" only because of the simplicity with which it can be explained. I am aware of its limited applicability; and in any event it has no intrinsic connection with conditional assertion. Domain-and-values semantics can also be supplied.
Space precludes motivating considerations for, discussion of alternatives to, or further development of (7)-(9). Also omitted is an account of the various logical relationships definable on the basis of these semantics. Instead we proceed to the development of the interaction between conditional assertion and quantification.
?5. Restricted quantification. One of the central ideas of modern logic is to take the Aristotelian A-form sentence not as primitive, but as analyzable into quite independent logical components: universal quantification and the conditional. Thus, "All crows are black" is rendered as "For each thing, if it is a crow, then it is black." Even when we hold firmly to this rendering, however, it is plain that different readings of the conditional, "if-then," or different readings of the quantifier, "for each thing," will give different accounts of "All crows are black." I now ask: what happens to "All crows are black" when the "if-then" is interpreted as conditional assertion as in (3) and the universal quantifier is read as in (10). (Please ignore the implausibility of the substitution interpretation for this example.) The formal aspect can be given as follows, where here and below I will be using the fact that Ct (t is a crow) and Bt (t is black) are categorical sentences, always assertive and always asserting the same proposition. Almost everyone, I suppose, has considered from time to time that "All crows are black" might profitably be read in this way, as saying not that being a crow implies being black, but rather something more like "Consider the crows: each one is black." (I despair of finding an altogether unambiguous English rendering.) What we have shown is that when the if-then of "if it's a crow then it's black" is taken as conditional assertion, one obtains this outcome from combining the conditional with universal quantification in exactly the way which is standard in modem logic since Frege and Peirce. It is important for the interest of this result that our analyses of the conditional and of universal quantffication are independent of each other, both in fact and in spirit. Nor was either one cooked up with restricted quantification in mind: conditional assertion was based squarely on previous work on conditional questions (see [1] , where Rescher's and Sosa's work on conditional imperatives is cited), while universal quantification was a straightforward generalization of conjunction.
Having unexpectedly obtained restricted universal quantification by artless combination, one wonders about restricted existential quantification. The standard reading of "Some crows are black" is of course given by 3 x (Cx & Bx), "Something is such that both it is a crow and it is black," and of course that is not the existential quantification of Bx restricted to crows. After puzzling for a while, one eventually remembers how hard it is to teach freshmen not to render 'Some crows are black" by "i3 x (if Cx then Bx)." Then, thinking of these foolish freshmen, feeling foolish oneself, and hoping no one is looking, one finally writes down 3 x(Cx/Bx) as a possible reading of "Some crows are black." And Aristotle be Russell if it doesn't turn out that this amounts exactly to that reading of the Aristotelian I-form which makes "Some crows are black" Obversion also constitutes a strong equivalence, but other immediate inferences do not fare so well. Take conversion of the I-form. The best we can say about the pair "Some crows are black" and "Some black things are crows," i.e., the pair 3 x(Cx/Bx) and 3 x(Bx/Cx), is that they are equitrue, which is to say that although their propositional contents are unrelated, still truth is preserved in passing from one to the other. But "Some unicorns are animals" is nonassertive while "Some animals are unicorns" is just plain false. For example, it is possible to use conditional assertion to frame a sentence supported by sentences having the form "t is black," where t names a crow, but to the confirmation of which sentences such as "t is not a crow" will be irrelevant even when what t names is not black. Our old friend, Vx(Cx/Bx) has exactly this feature. Let us adopt naive hypothetico-deductivism as our account of evidential support of low level empirical sentences, so that a (contingent) proposition is supported by the (contingent) propositions it implies, and an assertive sentence is supported by the assertive sentences it implies (in Our World). Then "All crows are black," when read as a quantified conditional assertion, is supported precisely by reports that such and such is black, where the such and such is a crow. But reports that such and such is not a crow, although offering support for the contrapositive "No nonblack things are noncrows"-vx( Bx/ Cx)-when such and such is not black, is evidentially irrelevant to Vx(Cx/Bx).
I do not take these remarks to lay the foundation for a solution to the paradoxes of confirmation. My only definite claim is that these paradoxes do not arise when "All crows are black" is read as a quantified conditional assertion. It is an entirely separate question whether anyone ever means "All crows are black" in this sense, and a still separate question whether quantified conditional assertions ought to be used in the rational reconstruction of science. With respect to the former point, it does seem to me that my account of conditional assertion allows a partial explanation of t-he source of the paradox. That is, if we agree that sometimes "All crows With respect to the reconstruction of science, the question is, do we want a kind of restricted generalization for the confirmation of which only positive instances count?
Quantified conditional assertions might be useful in summarizing sheerly empirical regularities without attribution of explanatory force. Thus, "Wages were high throughout the 1960's" might usefully be put by Vx( 1960 < x < 1969)/Wages high in x). Again, a psychologist wishing to report the trend of his results in a modest way might say, in a conditional assertion tone of voice, "Among American college sophomores taking elementary psychology courses, frustration is invariably followed by aggression." The psychologist would be using quantified conditional assertion as a way of limiting the scope of his proposed law without asserting that the antecedent has any kind of "connection" with the consequent. Similarly, a physicist might use quantified conditional assertion to report that a certain law holds good between boundary temperatures t1 and t2. If later he finds an explanatory relation between the boundary temperatures and the law, he may wish to change his form of statement to reflect this.
